Qatar. The vicissitudes of a micro-State of the Gulf: theoretical perspectives of the crisis
By Victor VALENTINI , on July 2, 2017 www.diploweb.com
atar is confronted with the reconstruction of a US-Saudi partnership harmful to its interests. V. Valentini puts into perspective the crisis that this micro-state of the Persian Gulf has been engaged since the mid-1990s in a diplomatic activism that seems to turn against him. The author evokes several scenarios and a rapprochement to follow between Qatar and Russia.
IN A FEW MONTHS, the strategic environment of the emirate of Qatar has been considerably clouded, until the beginning of June 2017, a major diplomatic crisis that does not suffer from The young history of the micro-state. As a result of the growing tension with its regional partners in the Arabian Peninsula, grouped around the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), an obscure piracy by the Qatar News Agency ( Qatar News Agency ) Diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, Yemen, Maldives and the United Arab Emirates end the illusion of " Qatari leadership " in the Middle East .
At the same time, the rest of the international community is wondering about the scope of such turbulence. They are not only a major challenge for Doha's foreign policy and more particularly for its emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, who perseveres in the diplomatic line opened by his father in 1995 but raise several questions about the unavoidable issues Of the region: the Syrian drama, the Iraqi question, the normalization of relations with Iran or Hamas, the Libyan reconstruction and of course the fight against Daech .
Qatar to stand trial
he Qatari micro-state is thus confronted with a double accusation: that of support for Islamic terrorism and that of its associates with the regime of Tehran. By invoking financial and other support for terrorist structures to justify a breach of diplomatic relations and a series of retaliatory measures, the sphere of influence, formed around Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, Reiterates the same argument put forward a few years ago on 5 March 2014 when the neighbors of Qatar (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain) were recalling for the first time their Doha ambassadors. In the same way, by emphasizing Qatar's close ties with Shi'ite Iran, The Sunni camp once again mobilizes the ancient grammar of a confessional rivalry (Shiite vs. Sunni) as the engine of international relations in the Middle East. However, it is difficult to identify in Qatar a "pro-Islamist" or "pro-Iranian" foreign policy. Like all micro-states, the preservation of its security and independence remains vital. The only support for one of these blocs appears theoretically deadly for Qatari diplomacy.
A strategy: ward off a power struggle that is largely unfavorable for a micro-state
Nevertheless, everything does not oppose ties with Islamists and Iranians in Qatar's foreign policy strategy . Hydrocarbon management, including the extraction of gas from Iran, the victory of several Islamist entities, including the Muslim Brotherhood in the aftermath of the Arab revolutions, regional and international security, terrorism and many others Common concerns. Qatar, as a micro-state, continues to pursue the same foreign policy objective: to counteract an unfavorable balance of power, using micro-state characteristics and changes in the regional and international environment to optimize its resources And establish another balance of power.
The geopolitical situation in Qatar partly explains the Doha style: sharing the largest natural gas reserve with Iran ( North Dome ), acquiring an American military umbrella at the expense of Saudi Arabia Arabic; the close historical ties with the Muslim Brotherhood as could testify instead of cheikh Yousouf Al Qaradawi [ 1 ] in Qatar, the decline (temporary?) of several regional frameworks in the wake of the Arab revolutions, or the inefficiency of the process Regionalization around the GCC, are all structural constraints for the Qatari foreign policy. But beyond the style, the diplomacy of Qatar translates a largely offensive attitude,
The Impatience of Powers
e know the difficult regional and international context that marked the sudden end of the extraversions of Qatar in the spring of 2017. The last weeks of the international scene saw the political reaffirmation of two major powers in the region, one international and the other regional, able to blow a frigid wind on the arid lands of Qatar. The meeting orchestrated for the first international displacement of US President Donald Trump with King Salman of Saudi Arabia on May 20, 2017, suggests a revival of the idyll between the United States and Saudi Arabia, Begun on February 14, 1945, when the "Quincy Pact" was signed, but halted in the 21st century by the involvement of Saudis in the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the development of terrorism. A few years after the collapse of American-Saudi relations, Qatar had become one of Washington's privileged partners in the region, as evidenced by the establishment in 2003 of the largest US military base outside the United States Qatari lands (Al Udied). Qatar is thus confronted with the reconstruction of a US-Saudi partnership harmful to its interests, moreover when it is formed around the principles of the fight against the financing of international terrorism and the will to face the aggressions of Iran . Of the largest US military base outside the United States on Qatari lands (Al Udied). Qatar is thus confronted with the reconstruction of a US-Saudi partnership harmful to its interests, moreover when it is formed around the principles of the fight against the financing of international terrorism and the will to face the aggressions of Iran . Of the largest US military base outside the United States on Qatari lands (Al Udied). Qatar is thus confronted with the reconstruction of a US-Saudi partnership harmful to its interests, moreover when it is formed around the principles of the fight against the financing of international terrorism and the will to face the aggressions of Iran .
The emirate has already repeatedly urged to shed light on the strategies adopted since the Diwan Amiri [ 2 ] , especially during the Arab Spring. The adoption by the United States of the anti-Qatar ( Qatar bashing) theses which the Saudi and UAE press have been carrying out for several years seriously complicates the management of the international image of the emirate at five years from the organization of the football World Cup. After several years of patience, it was necessary to elect a Donald Trump for the rhetoric Saudi and Emirati to translate into acts to put Qatar in its place of micro-state, the most symbolic of which is today the rupture Diplomatic ties. The challenges ahead are now more than ever.
"The strong does what he can do, the weak undergoes what he must undergo"
[ 3 ] In
order to grasp the nature of Qatar's foreign policy in recent years, it is necessary to refer to a fundamental characteristic of international relations: the capacity of states . History has been understood since the era of the Athenian historian Thucydides. Determined by the characteristics of its micro-statism, the identity of Qatar suggests a repertoire of limited actions and more particularly docile behavior towards the most important powers. Anglo-Saxon political science uses the notion of bandwagonning , introduced by Quincy Wright and democratized by Kenneth Waltz [ 4 ] , which illustrates, in this sense,
These are of course the Arab uprisings of 2011, and the profound overhaul of the political scene in the Middle East that followed, which constitute the breaking point between Qatar and its micro-state status. Through its chain Al Jazeera , by activating the networks of personalized alliances maintained at the top of the state with the various branches of the Muslim Brotherhood established in the region - Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, etc. - by its military involvement in the region (UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorizing intervention in Libya); Or by the deployment of its financial arm in the regional whole through the richly endowed Qatari sovereign wealth fund (QIA), In the direction of Palestinian Hamas or in support of certain fringes of Syrian revolutionaries; Without forgetting its dynamism in multilateral forums, as illustrated by the candidacy of Qatari Abderrahmane Al Attiyah to the post of Secretary General of the Arab League in May 2011 [ 5 ] : the micro-State is transmuted into a real protagonist and attributes, in This period, the other Arab countries no longer the status of regional power, but rather that of associates.
It is naturally this discrepancy with the micro-state identity of Qatar, and the behaviors associated with it, that forge the ire of the great regional powers Saudi and Egyptian. With regard to the involvement of the Emirati, the two states share an old fratricidal rivalry: if, for a time, enmities were fueled by territorial disputes, today's tendencies take the form of a competition between Two Gulf states that share many common strategies (cash diplomacy, the use of Soft Power , the mobilization of various Islamist networks, etc.)
The different scenarios
So, what future for the micro-state of Qatar? As a preliminary point, there are no doubts.
First , as a micro-state, the emirate of Qatar remains extremely vulnerable to the turbulence of its nearby environment.
Second , Doha remains heavily dependent on American protection to ensure its survival.
Third : the imbalance of the balance of power imposes Qatar to maintain good relations with as many actors.
Then, several blind spots remain. In the first place, there is the trial and error of the other historical partners of Qatar, such as Great Britain (tutelary power until 1971) or France . The two European powers are the other pillars of Qatar's foreign policy: a security pillar (several bilateral defense agreements have been signed between these countries since the 1970s), economic pillar (nearly 14 billion dollars have been invested in Europe Since the creation of the QIA in 2005) and strategic pillar, as illustrated by the participation of the emirate in the international alliance against the Islamic state. In the opinion of experts or diplomats,
Finally, the recent rapprochement between Russia and Qatar deserves special attention . Almost a year and a half after the Emir's first official visit to Moscow to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin on 18 January 2016, a new Moscow / Doha axis seems to be consolidating on the one hand, The signing of a first defense agreement on 6 September 2016 and, on the other hand, a strengthening of cooperation in the gas field beyond the Forum of Gas Exporting Countries (FPEG), and finally, by the first rapprochement Of an agreement between Moscow and Ankara-Doha on the treatment of the Syrian question. For several years now, Doha has sought to alleviate its dependence on American power.
Copyright July 2017-Valentini / Diploweb.com
[ 1 ] If historically the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood has developed around education policy in Qatar, the iconic figure of Cheikh Qaradawi and especially the issue, today interrupted, Sharia and Life ( Al Shari'a wal-hayat) broadcast on Al Jazeera, is the figurehead of the links between the frerist network and the micro-state. See on this point, KOBAISI Abdullah Juma, The Development of Education in Qatar, 1950-1977, Durham University, 1979
[ 2 ] The Emir's Palace
[ 3 ] Thucydides; The history of the Peloponnesian War - Fifth. BC. AD
[ 4 ] K. WALTZ, "Theory of International Politics, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1979
[ 5 ] The candidate was finally withdrawn to benefit former Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil-al-Arabi, who will be elected on May 15, 2011. See "Egypt FM elected next Arab League chief", Aljazeera.com, available at The following address: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/05/2011515165828986721.html
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